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NOTES

A VICTORY FOR THE LANDLORDS-OR IS
IT? THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 1997
AMENDMENTS TO THE RPAPL
WILLIAM H. JEBERG*

INTRODUCTION

Any issue that revolves around a person's home is an
important one. Residential matters take on particular acuteness
in New York, where the population is massive1 and
homelessness is a major problem.2 In New York City, the
landlord-tenant relationship is of particular importance, as
many such relationships exist,3 resulting in an enormous
4
number of eviction hearings annually.
A delicate balance must be struck between the competing
interests of landlords and tenants. While it may be just to
penalize a tenant who defaults on rent or wrongfully holds over,
forcing a person out on the street through eviction may be an

* J.D. Candidate, June 2001, St. John's University School of Law; B.A.,
Binghamton University.
I See Evelyn Nieves, San FranciscoFaces an Outcry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1999,
at A18 (estimating New York City's population at 7.5 million).
2 See id. (estimating that 23,000 homeless people use shelters on a daily basis).
3 For example, in New York City alone there are approximately 1,014,751 rent
stabilized apartments, 70,572 rent controlled apartments, and 1 million
unregulated apartments. See J. Soerensen et al., Zero-Hour Deal on Rent LimitsSome DecontrolWould Be Allowed, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 16, 1997, at 2.
4 See Dennis Hevesi, Judge Backs Law Requiring Deposits in Evictions, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1998, at B3 (stating that there are 300,000 eviction proceedings
brought each year, with approximately 25,000 actually evicted).
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unduly harsh punishment. On the other hand, a landlord who
relies on rent as income to pay bills should not be required to
shelter a delinquent tenant. Though the New York State
legislature has recognized that landlords who are wronged
deserve expeditious remedies, it has been reluctant to leave
citizens without homes. 5
Balancing the equities between
landlord and tenant can be a tenuous, if not daunting,
consideration. As a result, landlord-tenant statutes have often
6
been problematic and controversial.
In 1997, the New York State legislature enacted two prolandlord amendments to the Real Property Actions and
Proceedings Law (RPAPL).7 These amendments attempted to
limit tenants' delay tactics during the eviction process, 8 a
perceived problem about which landlords have complained for
some time. 9 With the passage of the amendments, however,
came reaction from tenants claiming that the amendments
violated their due process, equal protection, and separation of
powers rights. 10 These issues have not yet reached the New
York State Court of Appeals and are likely to be litigated
frequently with the rights of thousands of tenants potentially at
stake.
This Note analyzes the two recent RPAPL amendments and
discusses their constitutionality. Part I provides a brief history
of landlord-tenant relations leading up to the enactment of the
amendments.
Part II reviews the potential constitutional
problems of the amendments as discussed in Lang v. Patakj"
and what the court stated, mostly in dictum, concerning the
controversy surrounding them.
Lang is instructive in its
5 See infra notes 25-42 and accompanying text.
6 See Robert E. Parella, 1997-98 Survey of New York Law, 49 SYRACusE L.

REV. 703, 703-08 (1999) (discussing the competing interests of landlords and
tenants, stating that "[w]ith respect to evictions, landlords have long complained
that tenants abused the summary proceeding process"); Dennis Hevesi, Is it
Harassment?Or Is it the Law?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2000, § 11, at 1 (discussing the

sometimes rocky relationship between landlords and tenants); see also Lang v.
Pataki, 674 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1998) (rejecting plaintiffs' claims
that the new provisions violated due process).
7 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW §§ 745 (2), 747-a (McKinney 1999).
8 See infra notes 36, 39 and accompanying text.
9 See Parella, supra note 6, at 703; infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
10 See infra Parts II, III.

11 674 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1998).
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constitutional analysis of both amendments. Part III offers an
in-depth discussion of the constitutional issues as applied to the
statutory provisions. Finally, Part IV discusses the court's
inherent power to massage the statutes and the particular
circumstances under which a judge may exercise discretion
accordingly.

I. THE BACKGROUND, REASONING, AND PASSAGE OF THE 1997
AMENDMENTS TO THE RPAPL
A.

The Summary Proceeding:The Problems with Ejectment
Corrected?
At common law, the action of ejectment 2 was the only action
13
a landlord could bring to reclaim possession of real property.
Ejectment, however, was often disadvantageous to the landlord
who wanted to remove a tenant quickly, for the action was
plenary and therefore could be a long, tedious, and very costly
procedure.' 4 As was often the case, this process amounted to a
"denial of justice" to the landlords who, as a group, grew weary of
ejectment proceedings.' 5 During the relatively long time it could
12 Now codified as the Action to Recover Real Property, N.Y. REAL. PROP. ACTS.
LAW art. 6, §§ 601-661 (McKinney 1999). The Action to Recover Real Property is
still used when a summary proceeding is not authorized. See LOUIS FRIBOURG &
RALPH GERSTEIN, NEW YORK PRACTICE GUIDE: REAL ESTATE § 31.01 (Eugene
Morris ed., 1988) (giving as an example the case where a termination provision is
interpreted as a condition rather than a conditional limitation, thereby barring the
use of a holdover proceeding).
13 See JOSEPH RASCH, NEW YORK LANDLORD & TENANT § 29:5 (3d ed. 1988)
(stating that "prior to [the passage of the summary proceeding statutes,] the only
possessory legal remedy which a landlord had was an action in ejectment"); see also
Haskell v. Surita, 439 N.Y.S.2d 990, 991 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1981) (noting that
"historically, landowners were exclusively relegated to ... ejectment) (quoting
Fisch v. Chason, 418 N.Y.S.2d 495, 496 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1979)); FRIBOURG &
GERSTEIN, supra note 12, § 31.01 (noting that at common law, a landlord's remedy
was that of ejectment).
14 See 950 Third Ave. Co. v. Eastland Indus., Inc., 463 N.Y.S.2d 367, 370 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1983) (discussing the history and purpose of the summary
proceedings); Haskell, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 991 (stating that ejectment is both
"cumbersome" and "time consuming"); RASCH, supra note 13, § 29:5 (stating that the
ejectment action was "expensive and dilatory"); see also FRIBOURG & GERSTEIN,
supra note 12, § 31.01 (referring to ejectment as a more formal type of proceeding).
15 See Reich v. Cochran, 94 N.E. 1080, 1081 (N.Y. 1911) (stating that ejectment
often amounts to a "denial of justice"); Maxwell v. Simons, 353 N.Y.S.2d 589, 591
(Civ. Ct. Kings County 1973) (noting that the common law action was a "denial of
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take to bring a successful proceeding, 16 the landlord was denied
17
income from the rent while the action was pending.
Furthermore, because the tenant would not be evicted pending
the outcome of a trial, the landlord was effectively prevented
from renting to someone else to mitigate the loss. 1 8 The landlord
was also deprived of rights for a substantial amount of time
because the proceeding took so long to complete. 19 Eventually,
the New York State legislature responded to the situation.
To correct this perceived injustice to landlords, the
legislature created the summary proceeding 2° as a speedy and
inexpensive remedy.21 Non-payment proceedings (brought when
the tenant defaults on rent)22 and holdover proceedings (brought
in instances when the tenant wrongfully "holds over" after the
expiration of the lease or breaches and fails to cure some

justice" because it was expensive and slow); RASCH, supra note 13, § 29.5 (noting
that the statute was somewhat unfair because "in many instances [it amounted to] a
denial ofjustice").
16 The action can take "6, 9, or 12 months to get through the courts .... "
Symposium: Edited Transcriptof Proceedings of the Liberty Fund., Inc. Seminar on
the Common Law History of Landlord-TenantLaw, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 623, 64445 (Timothy P. Terrell ed., 1984) (quoting the comments of Professor Robert A.
Cunningham, University of Michigan Law School, at the Liberty Fund, Inc. Seminar
on the Common Law of Landlord-Tenant Law held at Emory University School of
Law on March 12 and 13, 1983).
17 See Fifty States Management Corp. v. Pioneer Auto Parks, Inc., 389 N.E.2d
113, 116 (N.Y. 1979) (noting that landlords often rely on rent to pay their
obligations). Prior to the 1997 Act, tenants were not required to deposit rents in
court during stays or adjournments. See Parella, supra note 6, at 703-08.
18 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 72-73 (1972) (noting that tenants are
"able to deny the landlord the rights of income.., or rental to someone else [and
that] [miany of the expenses of the landlord continue to accrue whether a tenant
pays his rent or not").
19 See supra notes 16-17.
20 The original summary proceeding statute was enacted as part of Chapter 194
of the Laws of 1820. It was eventually replaced with provisions embodied in Article
Seven of the N.Y. Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law. For a discussion of
the history of the action, as well basic introductory matters, see RASCH, supra note
13, §§ 29:1 to 29:16.
21 See Reich v. Cochran, 94 N.E. 1080, 1081 (N.Y. 1911) (stating that the
summary proceeding "was designed to ... provid[e] the landlord with a simple,
expeditious and inexpensive means of regaining possession of his premises");
Gardens Nursery Sch. v. Columbia Univ., 404 N.Y.S.2d 833, 834 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1978) (noting that the purpose of the proceeding was to provide a more
expeditious way of evicting tenants than ejectment); RASCH, supra note 13, § 29:5
(discussing the history of the summary proceeding).
22 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 711(2) (McKinney 1999).
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obligation under the lease) are the most common forms of
summary proceedings. 23 Landlords believed that they had
finally received a "speedy and expeditious" remedy, designed to
enforce "the right of the landlord to the immediate possession of
his real property. 24 Nevertheless, this statutory addition did
not end the dispute between landlords and tenants.
With the enactment of the summary proceeding laws came
statutes providing tenants with several means to prolong the
proceedings. 25
Because the summary proceeding was in
derogation of the tenant's common law rights, the New York
State legislature "enacted a comprehensive scheme to insure
preservation of certain of those rights while achieving the
purpose" of the quick remedy for the landlord. 26 In short, since
landlords were granted a speedy method to regain possession of
the premises, the legislature created safeguards to "comport with
due process."27 The legislature recognized that tenants also have
a significant property interest at stake in the landlord-tenant
28
relationship.
Two main devices were given to tenants to protect their due
29
process rights. The first safeguard device was the "stay."
Staying the issuance of the warrant could be effectuated in two
instances. RPAPL section 751(1) authorizes a stay after default
in rent. 30 After a judgment in favor of the landlord in a
summary proceeding establishing that a tenant has defaulted in
payment of rent, a tenant could "stay" the issuance of the
warrant.31 The stay could be initiated by depositing the rent
due, plus interest and penalties, with the court, which then pays
the rent to the petitioner landlord. 32 After the stay is issued, the
23 See id. § 711(1).

24 See Great Park Corp. v. Goldberger, 246 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1964).
25 See infra notes 29, 39 and accompanying text.
26 950 Third Av. Co. v. Eastland Indus., Inc., 463 N.Y.S.2d 367, 371 (Civ. Ct.

N.Y. County 1983).
27 Id.

2 See id.
29 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW §§ 751, 753 (McKinney 1999).
30 See id. § 751. The statute also applies to default on payment of taxes or other
assessments by the tenant. See id.
31 See id.
32 See id. A second method of staying the warrant is delivering to the court the
tenant's undertaking to the landlord "in such sum as the court approves to the effect
that he will pay the rent.., and interest and penalty and costs within 10 days, at
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landlord's right to dispossess the tenant terminates. 33 Thus, no
stay is really involved-the payment of monies due amounts to a
dismissal of the case. 34 The statute is construed so liberally
that this rule applies even after a judgment on appeal is
35
affirmed.
A related provision provides for a stay in the case of a tenant
holding over.36 Where a new lessee is entitled to possession, the
statute provides that the court may stay the issuance of the
warrant, without the consent of the new lessee, if it appears
that: (1) the premises are used for a dwelling purpose; (2) the
application by the occupant is made in good faith; (3) the
occupant cannot secure suitable premises within the same
neighborhood; and (4) the occupant had made reasonable
attempts to do so, or by reason of other facts there would be an
extreme hardship if the stay were not granted. 37 The stay is
effective only upon the condition that the tenant against whom
the judgment is entered makes a deposit with the court of the
amount due for rent through the month in which the lease was
to expire, plus the value of the use and occupation of the
38
premises.
The second type of device granted to comport with due

the expiration of which time a warrant may issue, unless he produces...
satisfactory evidence of the payment." Id.
33 See Hett v. Lange, 124 N.Y.S. 573, 575 (2d Dep't 1910).
34 See 950 Third Av. Co. v. Eastland Indus., Inc., 463 N.Y.S.2d 367, 371 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1983) (stating that "summary proceedings for nonpayment of rent
should be dismissed upon the tenant's tender of the full amount of rent due, rather
than stayed under a literal reading of the statute") (citing Flewwellin v. Lent, 86
N.Y.S. 919 (2d Dep't 1904)); 90 N.Y. JUR. 2D Real Property § 268 (1999) (conceding
that "[alithough the statutory provision authorizes a stay... no actual stay is
involved... [tihe payment in and of itself terminates the proceeding"); RASCH,
supra note 13, § 47:9 (noting that the proceeding is terminated and any other
warrant issued would be null and void).
35 See People ex rel. Kilgallon v. Nuhm, 156 N.Y.S. 559, 562 (Sup. Ct. 1915),
affd, 156 N.Y.S. 1151 (2d Dep't 1916) (holding that although the tenant appeals
after making a sufficient tender before issuance of the warrant, the landlord's
application for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel issuance of the warrant is
denied as a matter of law).
36 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 753 (McKinney 1999).
37 See id. The statute provides that the stay cannot last longer than a period of
six months. See id. There is a similar proceeding for staying the issuance of a
warrant outside the City of New York; however, the stay may not be granted for
more than four months. See id. § 751(4)(a) (McKinney 1999).
38 See id. § 753(2).
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process was the power to adjourn proceedings. 39 Prior to the
1997 amendments to the RPAPL, the adjournment provision in
RPAPL Article Seven provided that, upon sufficient proof of the
need to procure witnesses, or by consent, a party may adjourn
the trial for not more than ten days. 40 Furthermore, RPAPL
section 745(2) provided that, in the City of New York, on the
second request by a tenant for an adjournment, the court must
direct such tenant to post all sums due for future rent.41 The
court, upon a showing of good cause, could waive this posting
requirement. 42 This could easily be used to delay the summary
proceeding and allow rents to accrue.
Landlords have long complained that tenants abuse these
devices. 43 The idea behind the summary proceeding-to provide
for a speedy, expeditious trial44--was arguably negated.
Landlords complained that tenants were "granted multiple
adjournments for varying reasons while rent continued to accrue
and the tenant had absolutely no financial ability to satisfy a
judgment should the landlord prevail." 45 Additionally, after
considerable delay, tenants with the necessary financial
resources could frustrate the eviction process by depositing rents
due in court. 46 As discussed above, this results in a dismissal of
the claim and not a stay.4 7 Finally, in 1997, the legislature
reacted in an effort to aid landlords in their struggle with
delinquent tenants.
39 See id. § 745.
40 See id. § 745, amended by The Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997, Ch. 116,
[1997] N.Y. Laws 218 (McKinney 1997).
41 See id. § 745(2)(a). The statute provides that an adjournment to secure
counsel, requested by an unrepresented tenant on the return date of the proceeding,
shall be included as one of the two permitted adjournments. See id.
42 See id.
43 See Lang v. Pataki, 674 N.Y.S.2d 903, 909 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1998)

(noting the "abuse of the Housing Court process") (quoting Plaintiffs Brief at 68);
Yellen v. Baez, 676 N.Y.S.2d 724, 725 (Civ. Ct. Richmond County 1997) (stating that
adjournments were "perceived to be an abuse of the summary proceeding process").

44 See RASCH, supra note 13, § 29:5 (speaking of the summary proceeding as
"designed to remedy [the] evil [of an expensive, dilatory proceeding] by providing
the landlord with a simple, expeditious, and inexpensive means of regaining
possession"); see also supra note 21.

45 Yellen, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 725; see also Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 909 (discussing
the idea that landlords wanted "to ensure that [landlords] who obtain judgments
will be able to collect them") (quoting Plaintiffs Brief at 68).
46 See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
47 See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
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The New York State Legislature PassesAmendments to the
RPAPL:A Victory for the Landlords?

In 1997, the New York State legislature passed the Rent
Regulation Reform Act (the "Act").48
Besides revising the
existing rent regulation laws, 49 the Act contains two important
amendments to the RPAPL dealing with evictions. 50 Specifically,
the amendments responded to landlords' contentions 5 1 by dealing
with the abuse of the summary proceeding process. 52 The
amendments apply to leases in the City of New York and are
significantly pro-landlord. The first provision is an amendment
to the existing adjournment statute; 53 the second provision is a
new section concerning stays. 54 Both the amendment and the
new section contain mandatory language, which seems to give
the court little or no discretion in applying the provisions.
RPAPL section 745(2) applies to the adjournment of trials in
landlord-tenant disputes in the City of New York. 55
The
48 Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997, Ch. 116, [1997] N.Y. Laws 218
(McKinney 1997).
49 For instance, there were provisions lowering the luxury decontrol income
level and for a vacancy allowance when a second generation succeeds to the
apartment. See id. In 1997, the luxury decontrol income level was lowered from the
$250,000 of the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1993 to $175,000. See id; see also
Dworman v. Division of Hous. and Com. Renewal, 725 N.E.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. 1999).
For a summary of important provisions of the Rent Regulation Reform Act, see
Parella, supra note 6, at 826.
50 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTs. LAW §§ 745(2), 747-a (McKinney 1999) (requiring
proof that a judgment amount was paid to the petitioner or deposited in full with
the court clerk in order to stay the issuance or execution of a warrant of eviction).
51 See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
52 See Lang v. Pataki, 674 N.Y.S.2d 903, 909 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1998)
(referring to the legislative intent as "to end what was perceived to be an abuse of
the summary proceeding process"); Yellen v. Baez, 676 N.Y.S.2d 724, 725 (Civ. Ct.
Richmond County 1997) (stating that an "objective of the legislation [was] to require
the rent to be posted and thereby secure the landlord of payment if victorious"); N.Y.
Exec. Memo 116 (1997) (noting that the measures taken by the amendments will
"prevent[ ] abuses of the Housing Court system and ensure[ ] that judgments will be
collectible in the event the [landlord] prevails on his claim").
53 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 745(2) (McKinney 1999).
54 See id. § 747-a (McKinney 1999).
55 See id. § 745(2). This section provides in pertinent part:
2. In the City of New York:

(a) In a summary proceeding upon the second of two adjournments at the
request of the respondent, or, upon the thirtieth day after the first
appearance of the parties in court less any days that the proceeding has
been adjourned upon the request of the petitioner, whichever occurs
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sooner, the court shall direct that the respondent, upon an application by
the petitioner, deposit with the court within five days sums of rent or use
and occupancy accrued from the date the petition and notice of petition are
served upon the respondent, and all sums as they become due for rent and
use and occupancy, which may be established without the use of expert
testimony, unless the respondent can establish, at an immediate hearing,
to the satisfaction of the court that respondent has properly interposed one
of the following defenses or established the following grounds:
i) the petitioner is not a proper party to the proceeding pursuant to section
seven hundred twenty-one of this article; or
(ii) (A) actual eviction, or (B) actual partial eviction, or (C) constructive
eviction; and respondent has quit the premises; or
(iii) a defense pursuant to section one hundred forty-three-b of the social
services law; or
(iv) the court lacks jurisdiction.
When the rental unit that is the subject of the petition is located in a
building containing twelve or fewer units, the court shall inquire of the
respondent as to whether there is any undisputed amount of the rent or
use and occupancy due to the petitioner. Any such undisputed amount
shall be paid directly to the petitioner, and any disputed amount shall be
deposited to the court by the respondent as provided in this subdivision.
Two adjournments shall include an adjournment requested by a
respondent unrepresented by counsel for the purpose of securing counsel
made on a return date of the proceeding. Such rent or use and occupancy
sums shall be deposited with the clerk of the court or paid to such other
person or entity, including the petitioner or an agent designated by the
division of housing and community renewal, as the court shall direct or
shall be expended for such emergency repairs as the court shall approve.

(c) i) If the respondent shall fail to comply with the court's directions with
respect to direct payment to the petitioner or making a deposit as directed
by the court of the full amount of the rent or use and occupancy required to
be deposited, the court upon an application by the petitioner shall dismiss
without prejudice the defenses and counterclaims interposed by the
respondent and grant judgment for petitioner unless respondent has
interposed the defense of payment and shows that the amount required to
be deposited has previously been paid to the petitioner.
(ii) In the event that the respondent makes a deposit required by this
subdivision but fails to deposit with the court or pay, as the case may be,
upon the due date, all rent or use and occupancy which may become due up
to the time of the entry of judgment, the court upon an application of the
petitioner shall order an immediate trial of the issues raised in the
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amendment primarily limits the number of adjournments
permitted in a summary proceeding and requires that tenants
deposit monies with the court while the action is pending. 56
Specifically, the statute purported to sway the balance of power
back to landlords in several ways. First, the statute directs the
respondent tenant, upon the second of two adjournments, to
deposit the rent accrued with the court or pay it to the landlord
within five days, unless the respondent can show, at an
immediate trial, one of the four listed defenses.5 7 The prior
statute had given the court some discretion to waive the
payment upon a showing of good cause. 5 The amended statute,
however, limits the reasons for the waiver of payment and
requires an immediate trial to prove the defense.5 9 Second, the
statute provides for a penalty for a tenant's refusal to comply
with the court's order directing a payment or deposit. 60
Specifically, the court may dismiss the tenant's defenses and
counterclaims and grant judgment for the landlord. 6 1 Also, in
the event of a late payment, the statute mandates an immediate
respondent's answer. An "immediate trial" shall mean that no further
adjournments of the proceeding without petitioner consent shall be
granted, the case shall be assigned by the administrative judge to a trial
ready part and such trial shall commence and continue day to day until
completed. There shall be no stay granted of such trial without an order to
respondent to pay rent or use and occupancy due pursuant to this
subdivision and rent or use and occupancy as it becomes due.
(iii) The court shall not extend any time provided for such deposit under
this subdivision without the consent of the petitioner.
(iv) Upon the entry of the final judgment in the proceeding such deposits
shall be credited against any judgment amount awarded and, without
further order of the court, be paid in accordance with the judgment.
(v) The provisions of this paragraph requiring the deposit of rent or use
and occupancy as it becomes due shall not be waived by the court.
Id.
56 See id.
57 See id. The four defenses are listed in RPAPL section 745(2). See supra
note 55.
58 See supra text accompanying notes 41-42. Additionally, the phrase "two
adjournments" now includes an adjournment requested by the respondent for the
purpose of securing counsel. Id.
59 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 745(2) (McKinney 1999).
60 See id. § 745(2)(c)(ii).
61 See id. The only thing the tenant can do to avert this harsh penalty is to
prove payment. See id.
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trial that cannot be stayed.6 2 Finally, in accordance with the
imperative language of the statute, the court cannot waive the
provisions of the statute.6 3
The new provision-RPAPL section 747-a-concerns stays of
non-payment proceedings in the City of New York.64 RPAPL
section 747-a applies after a tenant appears,6 5 a judgment is
issued, and five days have elapsed.6 6 The statute mandates that
the court shall not grant a stay unless the tenant can prove that
the judgment has been paid or deposited with the court prior to
the execution of the warrant.6 7 This limits the tenant's power to
68
effectuate a stay after judgment for the landlord.
The additions to section 745(2) and the enactment of section
747-a seemed to be a victory for landlords. The two statutes
were enacted in an attempt to balance the interests of landlords
and tenants, at a time when landlords had long complained of a
The provisions, however, precipitated
pro-tenant bias.6 9
controversy and constitutional challenges on the grounds of
72
71
separation of powers, 70 due process, and equal protection.
n See id.
6 See id. § 745(2)(c)(v).
64 See id. § 747-a (McKinney 1999). Section 747-a reads:
In the city of New York, in any non-payment proceeding in which the
respondent has appeared and the petitioner has obtained a judgment
pursuant to section seven hundred forty-seven of this article and more
than five days has elapsed, the court shall not grant a stay of the issuance
or execution of any warrant of eviction nor stay the re-letting of the
premises unless the respondent shall have either established to the
satisfaction of the court by a sworn statement and documentary proof that
the judgment amount was paid to the petitioner prior to the execution of
the warrant or the respondent has deposited the full amount of such
judgment with the clerk of the court.
Id.; see also supra notes 43-47 (noting that a stay has been viewed by landlords as a
device abused by tenants to effectuate a dismissalofthe proceeding).
65 See Lang v. Pataki, 674 N.Y.S.2d 903, 914 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1998)
(noting that RPAPL section 749 may still apply in such a situation). It must be
noted that a court still has the discretion to apply RPAPL section 749, which allows
a court to vacate a warrant "for good cause shown prior to execution thereof' which
would allow a tenant who did not appear in the proceeding, claiming lack of
jurisdiction, to have the warrant vacated without a deposit. See N.Y. REAL PROP.
ACTS. LAW § 749(3) (McKinney 1999).
66 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 747-a (McKinney Supp. 1999).
67 See id.
68 See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
69 See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
70 See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 912-13 (challenging the constitutionality of
RPAPL sections 745(2) and 747-a on separation of powers grounds).
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II. LANG V. PATAI: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
The Supreme Court for New York County, in the case of
3 questioned the constitutionality of RPAPL
Lang v. Pataki,7
75
74
In Lang, the plaintiff-tenants
sections 745(2) and 747-a.
sought to enjoin enforcement of sections 745(2) and 747-a,
claiming that the statutes were unconstitutional. 76 The court
first denied the tenants' request for a preliminary injunction, as
there was no showing of irreparable harm that would ensue from
denying the motion. 77 This alone was dispositive. Nonetheless,
the court went on to assess and analyze the "constitutional
contentions under the belief that there may be shortly before
[the court] a motion for summary judgment on the cause of
71 See id. at 909-11 (challenging the constitutionality of RPAPL section 745(2)
on due process grounds); see also Targee Management v. Jones, 677 N.Y.S.2d 206,
209-10 (Civ. Ct. Richmond County 1997) (challenging the constitutionality of
RPAPL section 747-a on due process grounds); Yellen v. Baez, 676 N.Y.S.2d 724,
725-26 (Civ. Ct. Richmond County 1997) (challenging the constitutionality of
section 745(2) on due process grounds).
72 See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 911-12; Targee Management, 677 N.Y.S.2d at
208-09; Yellen, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 726-27.
73 674 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1998).
74 See id. Lang, decided in 1998, was not the first case to bring forth these
claims. Indeed, both Yellen and Targee Management, were decided before Lang. See
Yellen, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 724; Targee Management, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 206. However,
Lang is more appropriate for an analysis of the statutes' constitutionality because it
is the only case of the three that presents a detailed discussion on the issues
presented with respect to both statutes. See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
75 See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 906. Besides the individually named plaintiffs in
the claim, the plaintiffs also included four organizations that promoted tenants'
rights. Among the defendants named in the action were New York Governor George
Pataki, the State of New York, the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts of the
State of New York, and the Administrative Judge of the Civil Court of the City of
New York. See id.
76 See id. Plaintiffs sought to establish that the sections were violative of due
process, equal protection, and separation of powers. See id. The plaintiffs also
moved for certification as a class consisting of all persons living in residential
housing in the City of New York, as well as for the certification of two defendant
classes, namely all judges and clerks of the housing court. See id. at 907. This
motion, however, was denied because it would bind all tenants in the New York City
area and "[i]f the proposed result were adopted, it would mean that any tenant
appearing in Housing Court... would not be able to challenge any aspect of the
statute upheld in this decision." Id. at 914. The motion to certify the defendant class
was also denied. See id. at 914-15.
77 See id. at 907. The decision rested on the fact that the Housing Court is the
preferable forum for the resolution of landlord-tenant disputes and that the tenants
would have the opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes in that
court. See id. (citing Post v. 120 E. End Ave. Corp., 464 N.E.2d 125, 129 (N.Y.1984)).
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action for a declaratory judgment on constitutionality."78

The

court noted that the "voluminous submissions
application" indicated the importance of the issue. 79

this

A.

on

Lang and Due Process

The tenants' first claim in Lang was that RPAPL section
745(2) deprived them of a "property interest in violation of due
process."80 The contention revolved around provisions dealing
8
with requested adjournments and the deposit of monies owed. '
The tenants claimed that this limitation "denie[d] tenants the
time necessary to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner'-.82 and penalized them for various delays
beyond their control.8 3 Furthermore, the plaintiffs contended
that the statute violated their due process rights because it
deprived them of the right to a hearing on their defenses before
they were forced to pay rent. 84 The defendants, on the other
hand, argued that the tenants' due process rights were protected
because the statute provided for a trial8 5 and the tenants could
still pursue any dismissed defenses and counterclaims in
another proceeding. 86 Additionally, the defendants argued that
requiring a deposit of rent did not violate due process because
the tenants were contractually responsible for the rent, and if
there were an overcharge or violation of the warranty of
78 Id.

79 Id.
80 Id. at 908. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that
no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
81 See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
82 See id. (quoting Plaintiff-Tenant's Brief at 24).
8 See id. (treating a delay caused by the court when considering a pre-trial
motion as an uncontrollable delay).
84 See id. RPAPL section 745(2)(c)(i) states that if payment is not made as
directed, the court is instructed, upon application of the landlord, to dismiss the
tenant's defenses and counterclaims without prejudice and grant judgment for the
landlord. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 745(2) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
8s See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 908-09 (stating how defendants conceded that
although the statute only provides for an "immediate trial," it still provides for a
trial.); see also N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 745(2) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
86 See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 908-09; see also N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW §

745(2)(e) ("The provisions of this subdivision shall not be construed to deprive
respondent of a trial of any defenses or counterclaims in a separate action if...
dismissed.").
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habitability, 87 it would result in a refund of the amount
88
overcharged.
The Lang court held that the amendment to RPAPL section
745(2) did not infringe on the tenants' right to due process. 89 In
deciding the case, the court relied heavily on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Lindsey v. Normet.90 In Lindsey, the
Court examined an Oregon forcible entry and detainer statute 9'
"which was in many respects similar to the provisions" involved
in Lang.92 The Lindsey Court analyzed several factors at issue
in this analysis of the RPAPL amendments, namely the
expedited hearing, the requirement of posting a deposit, and the
limitations of defenses. 93 The Lang court relied on all three
94
factors in its assessment of the statutes at issue.
First, the Lang court quoted the Lindsey Court's analysis of

87 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney 1999). New York has implied in
every residential lease a warranty of habitability, which warranties that the
premises are "fit for human habitation and for the uses reasonably intended by the
parties and that the occupants of such premises shall not be subjected to conditions
which would be dangerous, hazardous, or detrimental to their life, health, or safety."
Id. The warranty cannot be waived by the tenant and any attempt to do so is void.
See id.
88 See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
89 See id. at 910-11. The Lang court also noted that leasehold interests are
protected by due process and the presumption that statutes are constitutional. See
id. (quoting Hotel Dorest Co. v. Trust for Cultural Resources, 385 N.E.2d 1284, 1289
(N.Y. 1978); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). The Hotel Dorest court
stated that there was a presumption that an act of the legislature was
constitutional and can only be upset by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and there
was a further presumption that the legislature investigated and found support for
the legislation. See Hotel Dorest, 385 N.E.2d at 1289.
90 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
91 See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 58-63.
92 Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 909. The Lang court summarized the Oregon Forcible
Entry and Wrongful Detainer statute, OR REV STAT §§ 105.105-.160 (1999), as
follows:
[The] statute provided that a trial on a landlord's action for possession
must be held between two and four days after service of a summons,
allowing the court discretion to grant a single two-day adjournment. Any
conditional continuance was conditioned upon the tenant posting security
for the payment of any rent that might accrue during the period of
continuance. The statute further limited the defenses that could be
asserted.
Id.
93 See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 909-10 (outlining arguments set forth by the
Court in Lindsey).
9 See id. at 910.
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the tenant's due process challenge to the expedited hearing.
"[WIhere a tenant fails to pay rent or holds over after expiration
of his tenancy and the issue... is simply whether he has paid or
held over, we cannot declare that the Oregon statute allows for
an unduly short time for trial preparation."95 When applying
this principle to RPAPL section 745(2), the court noted that the
"time periods set forth in the Oregon statute are significantly
shorter than those provided under [RPAPL section 745(2)], [and,
thus,] there is no basis for finding the New York time
restrictions insufficient per se."96 Moreover, the court noted that
the Lindsey holding "specifically approved" of the requirement of
deposits for additional adjournments. 9 7 The court quoted the
Lindsey Court as stating that this requirement is "hardly
98
irrational or oppressive."
The Lang court also applied the Lindsey analysis to the due
process and the limitation of defenses issues. 99 The court quoted
Lindsey in rejecting the notion that the statutory provisions
amounted to a denial of due process. 10 0 The court stated that
"Oregon [did not] deny due process of law by restricting the
issues.., to whether the tenant has paid rent and honored
covenants he has assumed." 10 1 The plaintiffs attempted to
distinguish Lindsey by noting that a warranty of habitability is
implied in every residential lease in New York, and the warranty
is interdependent on the obligation to pay rent. 10 2 As an
interdependent obligation, liability for rent is conditioned upon
the landlord's maintenance of a habitable premises. Therefore,
the plaintiffs in Lang believed that the state could not deny them
a hearing on the breach of the warranty of habitability, since a
breach by the landlord would constitute a defense to the nonpayment of rent. 10 3 The court responded by noting that the
95 Id. at 909 (quoting Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 64-65).
96 Id. at 910.
97 See id.
98 Id. at 909 (quoting Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 65).
99 See id. at 910-11.
100 See id. at 910 (quoting Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 65).

101 Id. (quoting Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 65).
102 See id.; see also NEW YORK REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney 1999).
103 See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 910. The plaintiff-tenants relied on the U.S.
Supreme Court case of Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). In Bell, the Court
discussed a Georgia statute that required a bond for a hearing on the issue of
liability in a motor accident case and held that "liability plays a crucial role in
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tenants still may raise a warranty of habitability defense and get
a hearing on the issue. 10 4 "It is only in seeking to adjourn the
trial is a deposit required of post petition rent, a situation which
the Supreme Court in Lindsey held was appropriate."10 5 Thus,
the court held that the 1997 amendments did not violate due
10 6
process of law.
B. Lang and Equal Protection
The plaintiff-tenants in Lang next asserted that RPAPL
section 745(2) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States and New York State constitutions. 10 7 The tenants' first
contention was that the statute treats tenants who can be
prepared for trial promptly differently from those who cannot. 0 8
Second, the tenants claimed that when either party makes a
motion resulting in a delay of the trial, tenants may be required
to make a deposit. 10 9 Finally, the tenants argued that the
statute treats tenants differently from landlords. 110 Defendants
countered by relying on Lindsey, arguing that there was no
violation of equal protection"' so long as there was a rational
the... [statute]" and "a release from liability or an adjudication of non-liability will
lift the suspension." Bell, 402 U.S. at 541. In Lang, the plaintiffs argued that a
tenant's liability is conditional upon the warranty of habitability, and therefore, in
accordance with Bell, the state must first determine if the tenant can be liable at all
before denying a tenant a hearing on a breach of warranty claim. See Lang, 674
N.Y.S.2d at 910. In other words, if a tenant is not liable, he or she may not be
denied a hearing on a breach of warranty claim.
104 See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 911. The court held that because there was an
opportunity for the tenant to raise a warranty of habitability defense, there was no
need to determine if the tenant is at all liable. This contrasts with the procedure in
Bell, where there was "absolutely no opportunity to assert a viable defense unless a
bond was posted." See id. (quoting Bell, 402 U.S. at 541).
105 Id. The court was referring to a statement in Lindsey: "Their claim is that
they are denied due process of law because rental payments are not suspended
while the alleged wrongdoings of the landlord are litigated. We see no
Constitutional barrier to Oregon's insistence that the tenant provide accruing rent
pending judicial settlements of his dispute with the lessor." Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 6667.
106 See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 911-12.
107 See id. at 911.
108 See id.
109 See id. at 911-12.
110 See id. at 912. The contention was that landlords do not have to make a
deposit in obtaining an adjournment when defending against counterclaims. See id.
M The Fourteenth Amendment mandates that no State shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
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relation between the legislative purpose and the provisions. 112
The Lang court again referred to the holding and reasoning
of Lindsey in deciding this issue. First, the court noted that the
applicable standard of review was the rational basis test;113 if the
classification had a rational basis, it did "not offend the
Constitution."114 Further, the court noted that, particularly when
social legislation is at issue, "the legislation is presumed to be
valid and will be sustained... [and] the Equal Protection Clause
allows the States wide latitude."115 The court stated that the
legislative purpose behind the Oregon statute, like the New York
statute, was the "prompt as well as peaceful resolution of
disputes over the right to possession of real property."116 The
Lindsey Court, finding a rational basis for the Oregon provisions,
held that "[s]peedy adjudication is desirable to prevent
subjecting the landlord to undeserved economic loss... [and
therefore,] Oregon was well within its constitutional powers in
providing for rapid and peaceful settlements of these
disputes." 117 The Lang court essentially concluded that since the
XIV, §1. Further, it has been held that the corresponding provision under the New
York Constitution is afforded the same breadth of coverage. See Dorsey v.
Stuyvesant Town Corp., 87 N.E.2d 541, 548-49 (N.Y. 1949) (determining that a
decision regarding discrimination must be based on equal protection clauses of both
the state and federal constitutions).
112 See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
113 See id.; see also Moccio v. New York State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d
195, 201 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the rational basis test is appropriate where the
particular class is not a "suspect class," which would require a "strict scrutiny"
standard). A suspect class can be identified by several factors, including a history of
discrimination or political powerlessness. Justice Powell said in Rodriguez that a
suspect class is determined when, "the class is ... saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 28 (1973); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938) (alluding that suspect classes include "discrete and insular minorities").
Since tenants are not a suspect class, legislation involving tenants is subject to a
rational basis review requiring a court to uphold legislative classifications provided
that the classifications bear a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose. See,
e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 66-67 (1911) (defining
rational basis review).
114 Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 912 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
485 (1970)).
115 Id. (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985)).
116 Id. at 910 (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 70-71 (1971)).
117 Id. at 912 (quoting Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 72-72).
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"provisions here... are so similar to Lindsey, [they] cannot be
118
said to violate the equal protection clause."
C. Lang and Separationof Powers
Finally, the court addressed the plaintiffs' claim that RPAPL
sections 745(2) and 747-a violated separation of powers. 1 9 The
tenants' argument centered on the respective powers of the
legislative and judicial branches, specifically, whether the
statutes "imping[ed] on the inherent power of the judiciary to
control the court proceedings and to adjudicate controversies on
the merits."120 The RPAPL section 745(2) claim revolved around
the "immediate trial" provision of the statute; 121 the RPAPL
section 747-a claim dealt with the requirement that "[the court]
shall not grant a stay of the issuance... of any warrant ...nor
stay the re-letting of the premises." 122 The defendants countered
by showing that the New York State constitution grants the
legislature the power to regulate court proceedings 123 and that
section 2201 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR)
124
evidences the legislature's power to restrict stays.
118 Id.

119See id.
120 Id.
121 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 745(2) (McKinney Supp. 1999-2000). The

immediate trial provision is believed to violate the separation of powers provisions
of the New York State constitution because it denies courts authority over their own
calendars. See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
122 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 747-a (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 2000).
Clearly, the prohibition against stays contained in the statute denies the court
recourse to this traditional discretionary judicial device as a tool to control a court's
calendar in the interests ofjustice. See, e.g., Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
123 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 30. This section provides that
[tihe legislature shall have the same power to alter and regulate the
jurisdiction and proceedings in law and in equity that it has heretofore
exercised. The legislature may, on such terms as it shall provide and
subject to subsequent modification, delegate, in whole or in part, to a court,
including the appellate division of the supreme court, or to the chief
administrator of the courts, any power possessed by the legislature to
regulate practice and procedure in the courts. The chief administrator of
the courts shall exercise any such power delegated to him with the advice
and consent of the administrative board of the courts. Nothing herein
contained shall prevent the adoption of regulations by individual courts
consistent with the general practice and procedure as provided by statute
or general rules.
Id.
124 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2201 (McKinney 1999). "Except where otherwise
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The court first discussed the plaintiffs' claim regarding the
constitutionality of section 745(2). The court noted that "[tlhe
courts are not puppets of the legislature."125 The court went on
to discuss the "inherent power doctrine," the theory under which
the courts were vested with an inherent judicial power to do
things reasonably necessary to administer justice.126 This power
enables courts to do several things, including "[to] perform
efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity,
independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions
effective."127 Thus, while the court apparently conceded that the
legislature had the power to regulate court proceedings, the
court also recognized the strong interest that courts have in
regulating their own proceedings.
In conjunction with the
statutes at issue, the court noted that a major function of the
inherent powers doctrine was to provide the court with the
necessary ability to control its calendar through the power to
stay proceedings. 128 Therefore, the court held that while the
requirement of a deposit as a condition to stay a trial did not
violate separation of powers, 2 9 the "immediate trial" provision' 30
prescribed by law, the court in which an action is pending may grant a stay of
proceedings in a property case, upon such terms as may be just." Id. This statutory
language on its face indicates an infringement on the court's traditional
discretionary power. See id.
12 Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 913 (quoting Riglander v. Star Company, 90 N.Y.S.
772, 775 (1st Dep't 1904), affd, 73 N.E. 1131 (N.Y. 1905)).
They are an independent branch of government, as necessary and powerful
in their sphere as... the other great Divisions. And, while the legislature
has the power to alter and regulate the proceedings in law and equity, it
can only exercise such power in that respect as it has heretofore been
exercised.
Riglander,90 N.Y.S. at 775.
126 See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
127 Id. (quoting Wehringer v. Brannigan, 647 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (1st Dep't
1996), appealdismissed, 678 N.E.2d 491 (N.Y. 1997)).
128 See id. at 913-14.
129 See id. at 914. The court drew a distinction between requiring a deposit as a
condition precedent for granting a stay and the outright prohibition gleaned from a
literal reading of the legislative mandate, and found that the latter interpretation
interfered with the court's power to control its own docket. See, e.g., John v. Regan,
406 N.Y.S.2d 938, 940 (4th Dep't 1979) (holding that the establishment of a fee
schedule did not deny access to court).
130See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (stating that the "immediate trial" provision
strips the court of its inherent power to control the docket and thus appears to
violate the separation of powers doctrine); supra notes 59, 62 and accompanying
text.
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certainly appeared to result in a violation. 131 The court stated
that "such mandate deprives a court of the authority under any
circumstances ...to adjourn or stay the matter and thus strips
the court of its ability to utilize its inherent power[s]."132
The court also briefly analyzed RPAPL section 747-a, which
restricts a court's ability to issue stays, under the separation of
powers doctrine. 33 After noting that the section only applied to
a tenant who appears in the proceeding, 3 4 the court determined
the statute to be "constitutional on its face, [although] it may as
applied be unconstitutional."135 The court provided several
examples of situations where the application of the statute would
strip the court of its discretion to issue a stay for good cause,
36
thus rendering the statute unconstitutional.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RPAPL
SECTIONS 745(2) AND 747-A
A.

Due Process
The United States Constitution provides that no person
shall be "deprive[d] ...of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." 137 The New York State constitution's due
138
process clause is virtually identical to its federal counterpart
and has been interpreted by the courts to have the same
impact. 3 9 Two key aspects of due process are the right to be

131See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
132 Id.
133 See id.

134A non-appearing tenant can still invoke the statute. See N.Y. REAL PROP.
ACTS. LAW § 749(3) (McKinney 1999).
135 Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 914. "An ordinance, constitutional on its face (or

deemed so) may be construed and applied in an unconstitutional manner." See
Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 136 N.E.2d 827, 833 (N.Y. 1956).
136See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 914. The examples included cases when a default
judgment ensues as a result of illness, when a judgment is entered improperly

pursuant to a stipulation, or a delay in obtaining money from Social Services. See id.
The court explained that it might be unconstitutional not to allow the warrant to be
vacated without a deposit. See id.

137 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
138See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
139See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd.,
20 N.E.2d 390, 395 (N.Y. 1939) (stating that a statute that offends the federal Due
Process Clause also offends the New York State clause).
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heard and the ability to defend oneself at trial. 140 Additionally,
as the Lang court noted, a leasehold interest is protected under
due process. 141 The concept of due process, however, is
flexible. 42 A statute may comport with due process on its face,
143
yet violate due process as applied to a particular set of facts.
Each case must be decided on its merits, as what may afford due
process in one set of circumstances may not in another. 144 In the
due process analysis, the first issue is whether RPAPL sections
745(2) and 747-a are unconstitutional on their face, by depriving
tenants who are being evicted of due process. Then, even if
constitutional on their face, the court still must determine
whether situations could arise when the literal application of the
statutes would violate due process. This issue is related to the
strict language of the provisions and whether the court can use
discretion in its application of the statutes. 145
With regard to the amendments to RPAPL, procedural due
process guarantees that a property interest-here the tenant's
leasehold interest-will not be taken away by an arbitrary or
inadequate procedure. 146 No particular procedure is necessary;
the concept of due process aims solely at a fair hearing or
140 See City of Buffalo v. Hawks, 236 N.Y.S. 89, 93 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 168 N.E.
438 (N.Y. 1929) ("[Ihe 'due process' clause in the two Constitutions assures to every
person his day in court, and an opportunity to be heard, and defend and preserve
his rights."); Woodwiss v. Jacobs, 211 N.Y.S.2d 217, 218 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1969) (requiring an opportunity to be heard even when the court is not permitted to
substitute its judgment for that of an administrative body).
141 See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 909 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
552 (1965)).
142 See In re Roxann Joyce M., 417 N.Y.S.2d 396, 397 (Fain. Ct. Kings County
1979) (stating that" '[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protection
as the situation demands...' ") (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972)).
143 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-34 (1976) (finding that
respondent had not been denied procedural due process when he was not granted an
evidentiary hearing prior to termination of Social Security benefits).
144 See Dobkin v. Chapman, 236 N.E.2d 451, 457 (N.Y. 1968) (discussing
adequate notice in relation to due process and how notice may be adequate in one
circumstance but not another).
145 See infra Part IV.
146 See Riglander v. Star, 90 N.Y.S. 772, 777 (1st Dep't 1904) (stating that "the
legislature is not vested with the power to arbitrarily provide that any procedure it
may choose to declare such shall be regarded as due process of law") (quoting Colon
v. Lisk, 47 N.E. 302, 304 (N.Y. 1897)); see also Deriance Milk Prods. Co. v. DuMond,
132 N.E.2d 829 (N.Y. 1956); People v. Hudson River Connections R.R. Corp., 126
N.E. 801 (N.Y. 1920).
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procedure. 147 Limitations on adjournments present several due
process issues. One issue is whether RPAPL section 745(2), by
restricting adjournments, hampers the due process guarantee of
a right to be heard. 148 In connection with the restriction on
adjournments, there is an issue as to whether requiring a
deposit as a condition of a second adjournment unduly burdens
the tenant who is not yet subject to a judgment. Another issue is
whether RPAPL section 747-a, by restricting stays and requiring
deposits for stays, has the same effect as the adjournment
provision. 149 A fourth issue is whether the mandate of an
"immediate hearing" provided by RPAPL section 745(2) gives an
inadequate amount of time in which to prepare for trial.' 50 The
last issue is whether section 745(2) authorizes or commands the
dismissal of all the respondent's defenses and counterclaims at
the immediate hearing, 151 thereby implicating the due process
152
right to be heard and defend oneself adequately.
It is helpful to look at the Supreme Court's analysis of the
Oregon Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute153 in Lindsey v.
Normet, 5 4 to determine whether the New York statutes violate
due process. The Oregon statute at issue in Lindsey is similar to
section 745(2). The Oregon statute allowed for a two-day
continuance, with a longer continuance based on the tenant's

147See N.Y. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 392 (1999) (stating that due process
"aims only at fair dealing, adequate hearing... and a procedure to obtain them").
148 See City of Buffalo v. Hawks, 236 N.Y.S. 89, 93 (4th Dep't), affd, 168 N.E.
438 (N.Y. 1929) ("It is asserted... that the commencement of an action in the
manner provided by [RPAPL section 745(2)] makes it possible for the property of a
defendant to be seized and confiscated without giving him his day in court, and that
it is therefore contrary to the fundamental law of the land.").
149 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 745(2)(a) (McKinney 1999).
150 See, e.g., Silverstein v. Minkin, 401 N.E.2d 210, 211 (N.Y. 1980) ("An
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is
to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.") (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)); Yellen v. Baez, 676 N.Y.S.2d 724, 725 (Civ. Ct.
Richmond County 1997) (noting that the immediate trial provision of RPAPL
section 745(2) violates due process for non-English speaking defendants without
interpreters).
151 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 745(2)(a) (McKinney 1999).
152 See id.
153See OR. REV. STAT. § 105.140 (1999).
154405 U.S. 56 (1972).
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posting of deposits for rent. 155 The continuance is analogous to
the adjournment provision of section 745(2), which provides for
one adjournment; however, a second adjournment may be
granted by posting rents, 156 much like the second continuance
granted in the Oregon statute. 57 Furthermore, the Oregon
statute required a trial not more than six days after service,
unless rent was provided.' 5 8 The requirement of a trial six days
after service under the Oregon statute 5 9 is analogous to the
immediate trial provision of RPAPL section 745(2).160
In Lindsey, the Court noted that the requirement of a
deposit as a condition for a continuance is "hardly irrational or
oppressive" and that paying rent in advance is nothing
unusual. 61 Furthermore, the Court noted that the requirement
of a deposit helps to balance the rights of landlords and tenants;
162
it assures that a landlord will receive any rent that is due.
The Court dismissed the defendant's contention that a lack of a
continuance does not provide adequate time to prepare for trial,
noting that "[tenants ... have as much access to relevant facts
as their landlord, and can be expected to know the terms of their
lease, whether they have paid rent, [and] whether they are in
possession."163 Thus, the tenant's claim in Lindsey, that there
was not enough time to prepare for trial, was unpersuasive.
Whether a tenant has paid rent and whether a tenant has held
over are not complex issues for which the tenant would need
months to prepare for trial. Thus, Lindsey supports the position
that on their face, the expeditious schedule and the deposit
requirement in RPAPL section 745(2) comport with due process.
155See OR. REV. STAT. § 105.140.
156 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 745.
157 See OR. REV. STAT. § 105.140.

158 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64 (1972) (citing OR. REV. STAT. §
105.135 (1999)).
159 See id. at 70 n.17; see also OR. REV. STAT. §§ 105.135, 105.140 (1999).
160 See N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW § 745.

161 See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 65.
162 See id. at 67 n.13; Mahdi v. Poretsky Management, Inc., 433 A.2d 1085,
1088 (D.C. 1981) (discussing prospective orders requiring payments and how if "no
such payments were required, the landlord would be compelled to permit a tenant
who does not pay rent to remain on [the] premises ... with little or no assurance
that any delinquency would be corrected").
163Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 65. The Court noted that this was particularly true
when "rent has admittedly been deliberately withheld and demand for payment
[has been] made." Id.
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Additional support for this conclusion can be found in the
court decisions of other states, including several decisions that
have relied on the reasoning in Lindsey.164 There is a consistent
theme that due process is not violated by an accelerated trial
because the purpose of the statute is to provide speedy relief for
the landlord and the tenant has knowledge of all relevant
facts. 165 This reasoning has been extended to land sale contracts
where the state allows for expeditious detainer actions based on
the default of a purchaser in possession. 166 In the face of a
procedural due process challenge, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held constitutional a Connecticut
statute providing for summary eviction of mobile home residents
"for the reasons stated in Lindsey."1 67 Indeed, the courts are in
agreement that "[d]ue process is satisfied so long as the...
statute permits continuances in cases requiring extensive trial
preparation."168
It should be noted that Lindsey has been
applied in other situations as well, including against nonresident defendants and as authority for not requiring a hearing
prior to eviction. 169
164 See Oaks v. District Court of R.I., 631 F. Supp. 538, 547 (D.R.I. 1986)
(requiring a tenant to pay a bond before an eviction appeal could be heard); Jordan
v. Duprel, 303 N.W.2d 796, 800 (S.D. 1981) (stating that a limitation of the time
allowed for pleading comports with due process, as was held in Lindsey); see also
Starks v. Klopfer, 468 F.2d 796, 799-800 (7th Cir. 1972) (denying an equal
protection claim regarding a five-day appeal bond requirement, relying on Lindsey);
Browne v. Peters, 360 A.2d 131, 132 (Conn. 1976) ("We conclude that [requiring a
tenant to] ... guarantee payment of the rent from the commencement of the action
until the conclusion of the appeal falls within... legitimate objectives.").
165 See Criss v. Salvation Army Residences, 319 S.E.2d 403, 409 (W. Va. 1984)
(stating that an accelerated trial does not violate due process because landlords and
tenants have the same access to facts); Jordan, 303 N.W.2d at 800 (applying
Lindsey in a due process analysis of a South Dakota statute, which provided a fourday limitation for a responsive pleading in forcible entry and detainer actions).
166 See Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d 853, 857-58 (Colo. 1985) (noting that "as in
landlord-tenant disputes, the facts involved in land sale contract disputes will be
equally available to both purchaser and vendor").
167 See Hancich v. Gopoian, 815 F.2d 883, 884 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Letendre
v. Fugate, 701 F.2d 1093, 1095 (4th Cir. 1983); Oaks, 631 F. Supp. at 547.
168 Butler, 704 P.2d at 858; Criss, 319 S.E.2d at 409; see also Letendre, 701 F.2d
at 1095; Oaks, 631 F. Supp. at 547.
169 See, e.g., McNeal v. Habib, 346 A.2d 508, 513 (D.C. 1975) (interpreting
Lindsey as "authority for the proposition that the due process clause does not
require an evidentiary hearing prior to the entry of a protective order"); Hancich,
815 F.2d at 884; Lexton-Ancira, Inc. v. Kay, 522 P.2d 875, 878 (Or. 1974) (extending
Lindsey from resident to non-resident defendants).
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The Oregon statute in Lindsey limited the defenses of
tenants; specifically, tenants could not assert that the landlord
170
failed to maintain the premises as a defense to non-payment.
The Lindsey Court held that limiting defenses was constitutional
because [tlhe tenant is not foreclosed from instituting his own
action against the landlord."171 As long as there is some
mechanism for tenants to present available defenses, there
cannot be a violation of due process.17 2 The Oregon provision is
similar to RPAPL section 745(2), which requires the dismissal of
tenant counterclaims and defenses when a tenant fails to provide
the necessary deposit. 7 3 Although it is true that "[dlue process
requires that there be an opportunity to present every available
defense," 174 Section 745(2) expressly allows tenants to pursue
lost defenses and counterclaims in a separate action; 175 therefore,
based on the holding in Lindsey, section 745(2) does not violate
due process. It is also important to note that frequently in
eviction proceedings, tenants' defenses and counterclaims will be
dismissed, as possession is the only issue on which the court will
rule;176 "[c]laims for damages normally are not heard, because
177
they can be raised in regular proceedings at law."
Lindsey appears dispositive on the issue of whether RPAPL
section 745(2) is constitutional on its face, and other courts agree
with this interpretation. 7 8 In Lindsey, however, the Court did
not address the circumstances under which the statute may be
found unconstitutional as applied; 179 this second step in the due
170 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1972).
171 Id. at 66.
172 See Butler, 704 P.2d at 858 (stating that because the "statute provides a

mechanism for ensuring that defendants will have an opportunity to fully present
available defenses, the statute on its face does not violate due process").
173 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 745(2)(c)(i) (McKinney 1999).
174 Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 66 (quoting American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S.
156, 168 (1932)).
175 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 745(2)(e) (allowing the use of lost defenses

and counterclaims if they are dismissed without prejudice).
176 See Vinson v. Hamilton, 854 P.2d 733, 735 (Alaska 1993) (stating that
"traditionally the court will recognize almost no affirmative defense or
counterclaim" in a summary proceeding).
177 Id. at 737 (citing Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 66-69).
178 See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 64; Letendre v. Fugate, 701 F.2d 1093, 1095 (4th
Cir. 1983); Oaks v. District Court of R.I., 631 F. Supp. 538, 547 (D. R.I. 1986).
179 See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 65 (noting that "it is possible for this provision to be
applied so as to deprive a tenant of a proper hearing in specific situations"); see also
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process analysis must also be addressed with respect to the
RPAPL amendments.
B. Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides that no person shall be denied "the equal
protection of the laws." 8 0 The New York State constitution
grants New York citizens similar equal protection rights.' 8 ' The
basic notion is that individuals should be treated similarly in
like situations. 8 2 The equal protection issue related to the 1997
amendments is whether tenants are discriminated against when
they seek an adjournment or a stay because they are required to
make a deposit. Admittedly, it appears that an equal protection
claim purporting to invalidate the amendments on their face
would be the weakest constitutional challenge 183 because the
statutes fail to establish a "class."1 84 When examining an equal
protection claim, courts apply one of two tests: strict scrutiny or

infra Part IV (discussing this issue in connection with the judiciary's inherent power
to tailor a statute to the facts).
180 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
181 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or
any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or
religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other
person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any
agency or subdivision of the state.
Id.
182 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)
(noting that the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is "essentially a direction
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike"); Walker v. Board of
Supervisors, 81 So. 2d 225, 232 (Miss. 1955) (discussing how equal protection means
equality of opportunity in like circumstances); Anderson v. St. Paul, 32 N.W.2d 538,
543 (Minn. 1948) (defining equal protection as mandating that the rights of all
persons rest under the same rule in the same circumstances).
183 See Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1985). The Butler court, in a
tenant's due process and equal protection challenge to the state's forcible entry and
detainer statute, did not even address the equal protection claim, stating that they
were "unable to discern the content of the defendants' equal protection argument."
Id. at 856 n.4.
184 For example, if a statute applied only to tenants on welfare, a "class" would
be established. Because these statutes apply to "all tenants, rich and poor,
commercial and noncommercial," no "class" was established. Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56, 70 (1972). If the statute applied only to tenants on welfare, however, a
"class" would be established.

20001

1997 AMENDMENTS TO THE RPAPL

rational basis. 185 The rational basis test is used when neither a
suspect class nor a fundamental right is at issue. 8 6 Under the
rational basis test, a statute is constitutional if it is rationally
related to legitimate legislative objectives. 8 7 Broad deference is
given to the legislature through a presumption that the statute
is constitutional,'88 particularly when the statute relates to
economics and social welfare, as is the case with the Rent
Regulation Reform Act of 1997.189 The legislation cannot be
arbitrary, 9 0 but it need not be perfect. Some inequality may
even result. 191 When a suspect class 92 or fundamental right 19 3 is
185 See Golden v. Clark, 564 N.E.2d 611, 613-14 (N.Y. 1990) (stating that when
a suspect class or fundamental right is at issue, the proper test is strict scrutiny,
and when there is no suspect class or fundamental right at issue, a rational basis
test is used).
186 See id. Rational basis review is the traditional, and easier test for a statute
to meet when it is challenged on equal protection grounds. This test determines
whether there is a "reasonable basis" for the classification and whether the basis is
"rationally related" to the achievement of a legitimate state interest. Hutchins v.
District of Columbia, 144 F.3d 798, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1998). It is used when there is no
"Rfundamental right" or "suspect class" at issue. Id. at 805 ("A statute that does not
involve a suspect class or a fundamental right enjoys a strong presumption of
validity, and will survive an equal protection challenge if it is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose."); Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.
1990); Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1264 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
187 See Golden, 564 N.E.2d at 613-14; see also Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (noting
that legislation is sustained only if the statute is rationally related to a state's
purpose); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (stating that equal
protection is "offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant"
to the state's objective).
18s See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (noting that legislation is "presumed to be
valid" in the face of an equal protection charge); McGowan, 366 U.S. at 425 (noting
the presumption of constitutionality).
189 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (stating that "[wihen social or economic
legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude");
Alevy v. Downstate Med. Ctr., 348 N.E.2d 537, 542 (N.Y. 1976) (stating that "[the
rational basis] test has been applied with great indulgence, especially in the area of
economics and social welfare").
19OSee Haves v. Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that as long
as the legislation is not irrational, it will survive rational basis scrutiny).
191 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 71 (1972) (noting that the state is
presumed to have acted constitutionally "despite the fact that, in practice, [its] laws
result in some inequality") (alteration in original) (quoting McGowan, 366 U.S. at
425-26).
192 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (stating that
traditional suspect classes possess "immutable characteristics determined solely
by... birth"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)
(noting that suspect classes are generally determined by disabilities unique to a
specific group, a history of unequal treatment, or a lack of political power).
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involved, however, the statute is subject to a heightened test
known as strict scrutiny. 194 When the strict scrutiny test is
applied, the government must have a compelling justification for
95
the course of action taken in order for the statute to be upheld.
In cases where a strict scrutiny test is applied, the statute is
196
often invalidated.
97
Since tenants are generally not considered a suspect class,
and the right to housing is not considered a fundamental
right, 9 8 the rational basis test applies to the equal protection
analysis. 19 9 It seems clear that the legislation is rationally
related to the objective of speedy adjudication of landlord claims,
as well as the elimination of the perceived abuse of the housing
process by tenants. 200 The goal of the legislature in preventing
tenants from abusing the summary proceeding process is indeed
an important one, as significant landlord interests are
193 See Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 93 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that fundamental
rights are "those rights which have their source, explicitly or implicitly, in the
Constitution") (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.15 (1982)).
194 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (noting that statutes infringing
on fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny and that "the infringement
[must be] narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest").
195 See Flores, 507 U.S. at 302.
196 See Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny because
a suspect class was involved-Japanese-Americans). Korematsu is one of the few
cases when the legislation at issue survived strict scrutiny. "[R]arely are statutes
sustained in the face of strict scrutiny." Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 n.6
(1984). The Court applies the most stringent review with this test. See United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 n.6 (1996). The Court recently noted, however,
"that strict scrutiny.., is not inevitably 'fatal in fact.' " Id. (quoting Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)).
197 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 70 (1972) (noting that a statute
applying "to all tenants... cannot be faulted for over-exclusiveness or underexclusiveness"); see also Frontiero,411 U.S. at 686 (discussing criteria of a suspect
class); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28 (same).
198 See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 74 (applying rational basis scrutiny and stating
that the Constitution does not guarantee "access to dwellings of a particular
quality" nor does it recognize "the right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his
landlord beyond the term of his lease"); Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth. v. Van Meter, 412
N.E.2d 151, 153 (IlM. 1980) (holding that a "wealth classification infringing on a
person's right to housing, a non-fundamental right, should be examined under a
rational-relationship standard of review").
199 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (stating that "if a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the
legislative classification as long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate
end").
200 See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
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involved. 201 Provisions that limit adjournments and stays and
require "immediate hearings" on occasion necessarily further
this objective, 202 as does the requirement of deposits, which aids
"Speedy
landlords in collecting judgments and rent. 20 3
adjudication is desirable to prevent subjecting the landlord to
undeserved economic loss."204 Providing a shorter time frame in

which to litigate such claims is not repugnant to the U.S.
to the purpose of the
Constitution, as it is rationally 2related
05
rapid settlement of such disputes.
Moreover, the deposit requirement is rational because the
money deposited is simply what is owed for rent or the amount 20of6
a judgment, and it is returned if the tenant should prevail.
When the deposit secures the payment of rent while the tenant
is in possession, "[t]here is justification for affording landlords
these protections." 20 7 It should be noted that the U.S. Supreme
Court in Lindsey struck down a statute requiring the posting of a
double bond as violative of equal protection. 208 This provision
was not rationally related to the purpose of the statute, as the
20 9
amount posted was more than the amount owed by the tenant.
Since there is no such provision in RPAPL section 745(2) or 747a requiring the tenant to deposit more than the amount owed,
the argument that the statutes are not violative of equal
protection is strengthened.
See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
The Lindsey Court apparently would agree with this conclusion, noting that
"[t]he objective of achieving rapid and peaceful settlement of possessory disputes
between landlord and tenant has ample historical explanation and support."
Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 72. The Court added, "It is also clear that the provisions for
early trial and simplification of issues are closely related to that purpose." Id. at 70.
203 See id. at 72-73; Lang v. Pataki, 674 N.Y.S.2d 903, 909 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1998).
204 Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 73. The expenses of the landlord continue to accrue
while the action is pending. See id. at 72-73.
205 See id. at 71-74; Hamilton Corp. v. Alexander, 290 N.E.2d 589, 591 (Ill.
1972) (holding that a shorter period in which to perfect appeals in possessory
disputes does not violate equal protection).
205 See N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW § 745(2) (McKinney 1999).
207 Dixon v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Mo. 1975) (holding that the
requirement of an appeal bond when possession of the premises has been
surrendered is violative of equal protection).
208 See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 74-79. The Lindsey Court applied rational-basis
scrutiny and held that the double bond requirement was "arbitrary and irrational."
Id. at 79.
209 See id. at 74-79.
201
202
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With respect to whether the statutes arbitrarily establish a
class, the Lindsey Court stated that the Oregon statute, which is
similar to the New York statute at issue here, "potentially
applies to all tenants, rich and poor... [and] cannot be faulted
for over-exclusiveness or under-exclusiveness." 210 The Court
added that "[tihere are unique factual and legal characteristics
of the landlord-tenant relationship that justify special statutory
treatment," since tenants are "in possession of the property of
the landlord."21 ' The statutes, on their face, cannot be said to
violate equal protection with respect to tenants generally. 212 As
the Lindsey Court held, Oregon was "well within its
constitutional powers in providing for rapid and peaceful
settlement of these disputes."213 It must be noted, however, that
depending on the particular tenant and the circumstances
involved, the statute may be deemed irrational under a due
process challenge. 214
C. Separationof Powers
The separation of powers doctrine, applicable to both RPAPL
amendments, 215 requires that no branch of government impinge
on the functions of another.216 In New York, the power of the
judiciary is vested in a unified court system;217 thus, neither the
legislative nor the executive branch may exercise judicial
power. 218 The power of the courts to do all that is reasonably
210 Id. at 70.
211 Id. at 72.

212 See Lang v. Pataki, 674 N.Y.S.2d 903, 914 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1998).
213 See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 73.
214 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (stating that "due process
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands"); see also infra Part IV.

215 See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d 903, 913-14 (applying a separation of powers
analysis to both RPAPL section 745(2) and 747-a). Both statutes involve a potential
conflict between the New York State legislature and the inherent powers of the
courts to control their dockets. See id. at 914.
216 See Loma Holding Corp. v. Cripple Bush Realty Corp., 265 N.Y.S. 125, 130
(Sup. Ct. Special T. 1933), affd, 193 N.E. 272 (N.Y. 1934) (stating that "neither of
the three of the co-ordinate branches of our government should overlap nor impinge
upon the rights of the other two... [as] the combined strength... lay in the
independence [of] one of the other").
217 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
218 See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 913 (stating that the New York "constitutional
structure is founded on the concept that each branch may not interfere with... the
other"); see also Hanna v. Mitchell, 196 N.Y.S. 43, 52 (1st Dep't 1922), affd, 139
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necessary to perform their functions is implicit in the idea of
"judicial power."219 This concept, known as the "inherent powers
doctrine," is the cornerstone of the separation of powers analysis
220
of RPAPL sections 745 and 747-a.
Although courts have this inherent power, it is clear that the
legislature has the power to create laws that regulate the
proceedings of the judiciary.221 This inter-branch conflict has
created difficulty in the application of the RPAPL
amendments. 222
The problem begins with the imperative
language of the statutes themselves. First, RPAPL section
745(2) says that "the court shall direct that the respondent...
deposit" the money for rent unless "the respondent can establish,
at an immediate hearing" one of four defenses. 223 The word
"shall" suggests that the court has no discretion in deciding

N.E. 724 (N.Y. 1923) (noting that "[tihe courts are not the puppets of the
legislature") (quoting Riglander v. Star Co., 90 N.Y.S. 772, 774 (App. Div. 1904)).
219 See Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (holding that "the
power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the causes"); Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 250 N.E.2d
690, 694-97 (N.Y. 1969) (discussing certain of the court's inherent powers); Langan
v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 62 N.Y.S.2d 440, 445 (4th Dep't 1946) (stating that "it
is well established that 'every court has inherent power to do all things that are
reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction' ") (citation omitted).
220 The inherent powers doctrine grants the courts "all powers reasonably
required to enable it to: perform efficiently its judicial fimctions, to protect its
dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective." Lang,
674 N.Y.S.2d at 913 (quoting Wehringer v. Brannigan, 647 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (1st
Dep't 1996)). All courts have the inherent power "to control the disposition of the
cases on its docket." Landis, 299 U.S. at 254. The New York "constitutional
structure is founded on the concept that each branch may not interfere with... the
other." Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 913. By enacting RPAPL sections 745(2) and 747-a,
the New York State legislature directed the New York State courts how to manage
their dockets. See id.
221 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 30 (granting the legislature "the same power to
alter and regulate the jurisdiction and proceedings in law and in equity that it has
heretofore exercised"). For the full text of N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 30, see supra note
123.
222 See generallyLang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (discussing how the immediate trial
provisions may interfere with the authority of the courts).
223 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 745(2) (McKinney 1999) (emphasis added). No
deposit will be required if the defendant can establish one of the following defenses:
(i) the petitioner is not a proper party to the proceeding; (ii) actual eviction, actual
partial eviction or constructive eviction, providing that the defendant has quit the
premises; (iii) a defense pursuant to section 143-b of the New York Social Services
Law; or (iv) a lack of proper jurisdiction. See id.
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whether to make the tenant deposit rent owed and more
importantly, directs the court to have an "immediate" trial,
regardless of whether the court believes this -is proper.
Similarly, RPAPL section 747-a directs that the "court shall not
grant a stay of the issuance or execution of any warrant of
eviction" when there has been a judgment and more then five
224
days have elapsed.
The essential question is whether the apparent mandate
interferes with the inherent power of the judiciary. 225 By
directing that a trial be "immediate,"226 RPAPL section 745(2)
leaves the judge with no discretion in the scheduling of the case,
which is a way of controlling the court calendar. Yet, courts
have noted that "[it is ancient and undisputed law that courts
have an inherent power over the control of their calendars, and
the disposition of business before them."227 Riglander v. Star

C0.228 supports the view that section 745(2) deprives the court of
its ability to use discretion in applying its calendar. 229 Riglander
held unconstitutional a statute similar to RPAPL section
The statute in Riglander required that certain
745(2).230
preferential cases be set for trial on a specific date and that the
court hear the trial on that date, regardless of availability. 231 In
224 Id. § 747-a (McKinney 1999) (emphasis added).
225 See Lang, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 913 (describing the judiciary as "an independent
branch of the government, as necessary and powerful in their sphere as either of the
other great divisions").
226 N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW § 745(2)(c)(ii) (defining "immediate" as meaning
that "no further adjournments of the proceeding without petitioner consent shall be
granted, [and] the case shall be assigned by the administrative judge to a trial ready
part and such trial shall commence and continue day to day until completed").
227 Plachte v. Bancroft Inc., 161 N.Y.S.2d 892, 893 (1st Dep't 1957); see also
Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962) (noting the court's power to dismiss a
case derives from "the control necessarily vested in. courts -to manage their own
affairs"); Headley v. Noto, 237 N.E.2d 871, 873 (N.Y. 1968) (noting that the "power
to control its calendar is a vital consideration in the administration of the courts");
Grisi v. Shainswit, 507 N.Y.S.2d 155, 158 (1st Dep't 1986) (stating that "it hardly
bears repeating that courts have the inherent power.., to control their calendars")
(citing Headley, 237 N.E.2d at 873-74); Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 489 N.Y.S.2d 914,
919 (2d Dep't 1985) (discussing the inherent powers doctrine used as a basis for
calendar control) (citing Plachte, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 893).
228 90 N.Y.S. 772 (1st Dep't. 1904), affd, 73 N.E. 1131 (N.Y. 1905).
229 See id. at 775.
230 See id. at 778.
231 The statute at issue in Riglander was the old New York Code of Civil
Procedure section 793, which provided for a procedure which gave judges the ad hoc
power to pre-schedule cases. See ch. 173, § 793, [1904] N.Y. Laws 312.
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holding that the statute violated the court's power to conduct its
own affairs, the New York Appellate Division stated that
although the legislature regulates judicial procedure, it had
never "attempted to deprive the courts of that judicial discretion
which they have been always accustomed to exercise." 23 2 Like
section 745(2), the statute in Riglander provided that the court
"must" designate a certain day for the hearing and "shall"hear
the case on that day.233 Although that particular statute did not
designate an immediate hearing per se, it effectively tied the
234
court's hands by designating a specific date for the hearing.
When compared with the section 745(2) requirement that the
court "shall" grant an immediate trial, it is apparent that the
legislature, in passing this amendment to the RPAPL, infringed
on the court's inherent discretion to regulate its calendar, a
fundamental judicial power.
It should be noted, however, that "[mlerely because a
particular section does not comport with [the court's] own idea of
what is needed for efficient judicial administration furnishes
insufficient basis for declaring that section unconstitutional." 235
In Cohn v. Bochard Affiliations,236 the New York Court of
Appeals noted that the court must "accord to the legislature.., a
considerable degree of controlling effect over the powers of the
court." 23 7 In that case, the court held that a statutory provision
eliminating the motion to dismiss did not deprive the court of its
inherent power to regulate its own proceedings. 238 The court, in
reversing the Appellate Term, chose to distinguish Riglander
rather than overrule it.239 Riglander dealt with issues already
on the calendar, while the statute in Cohn concerned whether a
case "should ever reach a trial on the merits;" in other words, a
case not yet on the calendar. 240 This difference also supports the
conclusion that RPAPL section 745(2) violates the separation of
232 Riglander, 90 N.Y.S. at 775.

233 See [1904] ch. 173, § 793, [1904] N.Y. Laws 313 (emphasis added).
234 See Riglander,90 N.Y.S. at 774.
235 Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 250 N.E.2d 690, 697 (N.Y. 1969).
236 250 N.E.2d 690 (N.Y. 1969).
237 Id. at 697.
238 See id. at 697. The statute involved in Cohn was N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3216
(McKinney 1967); see also Cohn, 250 N.E.2d at 691.
239 See Cohn, 250 N.E.2d at 696 (discussing the difference between the statute
involved in Riglanderand the one at issue in Cohn).
240

Id.
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powers doctrine. The "immediate trial" provision does not come
into play before the trial is placed on the calendar, but after a
trial has been scheduled and adjourned. 241 "This [is] a matter
which, by long tradition, had been left to the absolute discretion
of the courts to exercise not only on the basis of calendar
convenience but also upon considerations of fairness to the
parties concerned."242 Thus, because adjournments are an
important way for courts to control their calendars, and because
section 745(2), when read literally, limits adjournments and
directs immediate trials, the statute seems to violate the
separation of powers doctrine. The legislature here, in effect,
attempted to exercise a judicial function by controlling the
court's calendar. 243
On the other hand, the provision
commanding the court to require deposits 244 does not seem to
interfere with the court's power to control its calendar. Unlike
the "immediate hearing" provision, 245 the requirement of making
a deposit as a condition for a delay does not schedule the court
proceedings or deprive the court of the power to adjourn; it
246
merely imposes a condition upon doing so.
Much like RPAPL section 745(2), section 747-a is written in
strict language, giving the court little or no discretion to issue
stays.247 When issuing stays, the court's discretion is even more
important. 248 "[Tihe power to stay proceedings is incidental to
the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the
241 An "immediate hearing" is not mandated until the second of two
adjournments, which means that the "trial" has already been adjourned and is thus
already scheduled. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 745(2)(c)(ii) (McKinney 1999).
242 Cohn, 250 N.E.2d at 696 (emphasis added) (discussing the statute and the
reasoning involved in the Riglanderdecision).
243 See supra note 220 (discussing the courts' inherent power to control their
dockets).
2" See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 745(2)(a).

245

Id.

The court is not prohibited from issuing a stay, but the legislature has
merely made the payment of a deposit a prerequisite to a grant of a stay. See id.
247 See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAw § 747-a (McKinney 1999).
248 See Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 216 N.Y.S. 215, 224 (1st Dep't.
1926), afld, 155 N.E. 749 (N.Y. 1927) (noting that a stay is a "matter which is
wholly discretionary with the courts"); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. §2201 (McKinney
1999) (codifying the courts' inherent power to grant stays "upon such terms as may
be just"); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 93 (1974) ("The power to issue a stay is
inherent in judicial power.") (Douglas, J., dissenting); Maloney v. Rincon, 581
N.Y.S.2d 120, 122 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1992) (citing New York C.P.L.R. section
2201 as the codification of the court's inherent power to grant a stay).
246
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causes on its docket... this can best be done... [by] the
exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing
interests .... "249 As the court in Lang demonstrated, there may
be times when a court must, as it weighs the interests of the
litigants, issue a stay. It would be unconstitutional to deny the
court power to stay an issuance of the warrant. 250 Applying the
statute literally would violate separation of powers 251 by
permitting the legislature to infringe on the court's inherent
power. The legislature "certainly may not interfere, so as to
252
deprive the courts of all discretion" with regard to stays.
IV. EXERCISING INHERENT JUDICIAL POWER

A.

The Court'sPower to Exercise Discretion in the Interests of
Justice
Courts, in determining whether statutes have been applied
constitutionally, require the ability to massage statutes and
exercise discretion to ensure that the interests of justice are best
served. In Mennella v. Lopez-Torres,253 the New York State
Court of Appeals discussed the boundaries of this discretion. 254
Mennella involved a default judgment in an eviction nonpayment proceeding. 255 It was undisputed that the landlord
complied fully with all notice requirements in the proceeding
when the default judgment was obtained. 256 The Civil Court
judge, however, entered judgment with a stamped notation that
the warrant may issue only after five days passed from the
249 Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936).
2M The court in Lang cited examples such as a tenant's illness, inability or
failure to receive Social Services payments, or improper entry of an order. See Lang
v. Pataki, 674 N.Y.S.2d 903, 914 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1998).
251 By depriving the courts of their inherent power to exercise their discretion
by issuing stays, the legislature has usurped the court's inherent power to control
their calendars.
2Z2 Sliosberg, 216 N.Y.S. at 224.
2W 695 N.E.2d 703 (N.Y. 1998).
254 See id. at 704 (recognizing the delicate nature of "balanc[ing] the rights of
landlords and tenants [in] provid[ing] for expeditious and fair procedures for the
determination of disputes ...
25 See id.
2M See id. (noting that "in accordance with the procedures of Article 7, service of

the notice of petition and the petition upon the tenant.., was duly effected... and
the required papers for obtaining a judgment by default were filed with the court").
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service of a copy of the judgment on the tenant by mail. 25 7 The
petitioner landlord then sought mandamus to compel issuance of
258
the warrant of eviction without the added notice requirement.
The judge thereafter issued the warrant, rendering the
mandamus proceeding moot; 259 however, he amended the
judgment sua sponte and stayed the execution of the warrant
260
until five days after notice was sent to the tenant by mail.
Thereafter, the landlord brought a second mandamus to compel
a proceeding seeking the issuance of the warrant without the
condition of notice. 261 The Court of Appeals noted that the
requirement of a default judgment as a condition precedent to
the execution of a warrant was imposed for no reason other than
the individual judge's policy of imposing additional safeguards
for defaulting tenants in non-payment proceedings. 262 The notice
requirement was not imposed "because of any actual or apparent
infirmity in the process.., or that it was incidental to... good
2 63
cause."
Thus, the question before the court in Mennella revolved
around "the authority of Judges of the Civil Court... to impose
additional procedural hurdles upon landlords before obtaining an
eviction" when there is a default judgment in a summary
proceeding. 264 RPAPL section 749(1) provides, in part, that
"[u]pon rendering a final judgment for petitioner, the court shall
issue a warrant directed to the sheriff.., to put the petitioner
into full possession."265 The court, relying on Brusco v. Braun,266
interpreted the imperative "shall" as directing the court to
257 See id. The stamped notation read "[flinal judgment of possession only.

Warrant may issue 5 days after service of copy of the judgment upon the tenant by
regular mail with a post office certificate of mailing to be filed with the clerk of the
court." Id.

25 See id.
See
See
See
See
263 Id.
259
260
261
262

id.
id.
id.
id.

264 Id.

265 N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 749 (McKinney 1999) (emphasis added). The
court in Mennella noted that RPAPL section 749(3) allows the court to vacate a

judgment for good cause prior to the execution, but there was no contention by the
tenants in Mennella that there was any application to vacate the judgment. See
Mennella, 695 N.E.2d at 704.
266 645 N.E.2d 724, 726 (N.Y. 1994) (interpreting the term "shall").
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"render an unqualified judgment upon tenant's default."267
Declaring, "[judges... presiding over... summary proceedings
268
lack the authority to fashion additional notice requirements,"
the court deferred to the legislature and its right to regulate
court proceedings. The court concluded, however, that the judge
who stayed the execution of the warrant did so for no particular
reason. 269 The court, in addressing the judiciary's inherent
power to issue stays in the interests of justice, "assume[d],
without deciding, that there
may be
particularized
circumstances in an individual case, where upon a showing of
good cause, the court would have the authority" to issue a
stay.2 7 0 While great deference was given to the legislature to
regulate such proceedings, the court still maintained the
authority to exercise its discretion in particular situations when
it would be unjust to apply the statute literally. As Mennella
stresses, however, the court must defer to the legislature when
27 1
there are no such circumstances.
Courts have failed to comply with legislative mandates in
other instances when the particular circumstances of a case
suggest that the court should use its inherent judicial power.
For instance, in the rent stabilization and luxury decontrol
cases, the Court of Appeals held that the Division of Housing
and Community Renewal (DHCR) has the authority to accept
late responses, although the applicable statute provides that
notice "shall" be given within sixty days of service.2 72 Again, the
court, or in this case the administrative agency, must have good
273
cause to avoid abusing its discretion.
Another area where a similar result is reached is the power
267 Mennella, 695 N.E.2d at 705.
268 Id. at 704.
269 See id. at 705.
270 Id.

271 See id. ("[Rlespondent Judge lacked the discretionary legal authority to thus
fashion an additional procedural safeguard, as a matter of policy... beyond the
policy choices made by the legislature in this regard.").
272 See Dworman v. New York State Div'n of Hous. and Community Renewal,
725 N.E.2d 613, 616 (N.Y. 1999). Relying in part on Mennella, the Court of Appeals
held in three consolidated cases that the Division of Housing and Community
Renewal (DHCR) could accept late notice for good cause, which included being in
Europe and not receiving mail and mistakenly sending notice to the landlord rather
than the DHCR. See id. at 616-17. However, "inadvertent neglect" was not
considered good cause for the extension. See id. at 618.
273 See id. at 621.
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to vacate default judgments. 274
Although the applicable
statute 275 directs that a court may vacate a judgment for
excusable default if a motion is made within one year after
service of a copy of the judgment, 276 the court has inherent power
to open vacated judgments in the interest of justice277 "even after
278
the expiration of the one-year period."
Seemingly, the Mennella court's ruling defers to the
legislature in regard to regulation of judicial proceedings. The
court, however, may be able to tailor the statute to the facts of
the case if it is in the interests of justice. This may become very
important in the application of RPAPL sections 745(2) and 747-a.
B.

When DiscretionShould Be Exercised in Applying Sections
745(2) and 747-a
As noted earlier, a statute that is constitutional on its face
may be unconstitutional as applied, depending on the merits,
facts, and circumstances of each case.27 9 The court's inherent
power to tailor the statute to the facts becomes crucial in
preserving the statute's constitutionality. Three times in the
brief life of RPAPL sections 745(2) and 747-a, the statutes have
been challenged successfully 28 0 on constitutional grounds as
related to the circumstances of a particular case.28 ' In each case,
the statutes could not be applied literally because they would
have violated the constitutional protections of due process and
274 See Rhulen-Immoor, Inc. v. Rivera, 403 N.Y.S.2d 586, 587 (3d Dep't 1978)

(holding that a default judgment may be opened after the one-year period). The trial
court in Rhulen-Immoor initially opened the default judgment, but withdrew its
decision and denied the appellant's motion to vacate because the one-year period
had expired. See id.; see also Abbott v. Conway, 539 N.Y.S.2d 538, 539 (3d Dep't
1989) (agreeing that default judgments may be opened after the one-year period,

but refusing to do so because good cause was not shown).
275 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5015 (McKinney 1999).
276 See id.

277 See Machnick Builders v. Grand Union Co., 381 N.Y.S.2d 551, 552 (3d Dep't
1976).
278 Id.

279 See supra notes 142-44, 179, 214 and accompanying text.

280 This does not include the Lang decision holding that there was a violation of
the separation of powers doctrine.
281 See Jones v. Allen, 712 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 2000);
Targee Management v. Jones, 677 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Civ. Ct. Richmond County 1997);
Yellen v. Baez, 676 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Civ. Ct. Richmond County 1997). The same judge
decided both Targee Management and Yellen.
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equal protection. 282 The court was forced to tailor the statutes in
the interests of justice.
In Yellen v. Baez,283 the respondent tenant was a Spanishspeaking woman who appeared pro se.284 The first time the
tenant appeared, the court determined that an interpreter would
be necessary. 285 Since interpreters were not available absent a
special request, the court granted an adjournment on behalf of
the respondent tenant. 286 The issue thus arose as to whether the
adjournment could be charged to the tenant; if so, section 745(2)
would require a posting of rents in order for the tenant to get a
second adjournment. 287 The statute, as the court pointed out,
had no provision for the handling of adjournments that were
necessary under such circumstances and thereby severely
deprived the court of its discretion to decide whether the tenant
288
should be charged for the adjournment.
The court held that charging the tenant with an
adjournment would violate both due process and equal
protection. 289
In addressing the tenant's due process
entitlement, the court noted that part of the right to due process
290
included the "right to have interpretive services furnished."
Thus, the failure of the court to appoint an interpreter violated
282 See Jones, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 329 (holding that the statute is unconstitutional
as applied to temporary stays because it interferes with the court's power to act in
the interest of justice); Targee Management, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 229 (holding that a
literal reading of the statute required that in order for a tenant to be granted a stay,
the tenant must pay into court an excess of any possible judgment; if the tenant
cannot do so, the statute would not afford the tenant a stay); Yellen, 676 N.Y.S.2d at
726 (holding that charging the defendant for an adjournment, when such
adjournment was necessary to obtain an interpreter, would violate the due process
rights of the defendant).
283 676 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Civ. Ct. Richmond County 1997).
28 See id. at 724.
28 See id.
286 See id. The petitioners at all times were prepared to go on with the trial. See
id.
287 See id. The tenant did not raise one of the four defenses, in which case no
adjournment would be required. See id. at 725.
288 See id. at 725, 727. The court was expressly critical of the legislature by
stating that "in stripping the Court of all its discretion, [the amendment] has
fashioned a new ministerial role for the judiciary, one that can better be performed
by a bookkeeper, rather than a jurist, at the expense of litigant's rights." Id. at 727.
289 See id. at 725-26.
290 Id. at 726. This requirement of an adequate translation applies to people
who do not speak English, as well as people who cannot understand for other
reasons, such as if they suffer from a disability or are in need of a guardian. See id.
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due process. 29 1 Although the right to an interpreter is not
fundamental, the court held that allowing a Spanish-speaking
tenant to proceed without an interpreter would violate due
process. 292 Therefore, charging the tenant with an adjournment
in this type of situation, thereby requiring rent deposits upon the
second adjournment, "would make a mockery of the due process
protection afforded by the Constitution."293
In analyzing the RPAPL amendments under an equal
protection context, the court chose to apply strict scrutiny.294
The court noted that language could be a basis for discrimination
when the result discriminated against persons who do not speak
English.295 Applying strict scrutiny, the court held that RPAPL
section 745(2) "burdens a fundamental right... to understand
the nature of the litigation and provide a proper defense."296
Additionally, the court noted that an analysis using the rational
basis test would have produced the same result.297
"[Tihe
method chosen here to achieve [speedy adjudication of landlord
and tenant disputes] is not rationally related to that purpose
since it discriminates against persons who cannot speak

English.

. .. "298

Also, the court noted that the legislature could

not have intended such an absurd result. 299

291 See id. at 726 (citing People v. Rodriguez, 546 N.Y.S.2d 769, 772 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1990)).
292 See id. at 724. While there is no fundamental right to have proceedings
interpreted, a failure to provide an interpreter would deny non-English speaking
litigants the ability to communicate to protect his or her fundamental rights,
thereby denying access to the legal process.
293 Id. at 726.
294 See id. (citing Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1983))
("Where a governmefital action disadvantages a suspect class or burdens a
fundamental right, the conduct must be strictly scrutinized and will be upheld only
if the government can establish a compelling justification for the action.").
295 See id.
296 Id.

297 See id. at 727 (quoting Soberal-Perez, 717 F.2d at 41) (stating that when a
suspect class or fundamental right is not affected, the legislation must only be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose in order to be valid).
298 Id.

299 The court went on to state that it is entirely possible that a tenant can be
charged with two adjournments rather quickly. There can be one adjournment for
the interpreter and a second adjournment to secure counsel after being informed of
this right through the interpreter. See id. at 725. The idea that the tenant can be
penalized in this manner is rather harsh.
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Targee Management v. Jones3 00 likewise dealt with the
constitutionality of the amendments. The respondent tenant
had previously entered into a stipulation that stayed the
execution of the warrant and judgment, provided that the tenant
made payments to the landlord pursuant to a schedule agreed to
by both parties. 30 1 The tenant made the first two payments, but
302
subsequently defaulted on three remaining payments.
Thereafter, the landlord brought an action requesting issuance
of a warrant of eviction. 30 3 The tenant agreed that she defaulted,
but contended that she now had the ability to pay the balance
30 4
that was due.
First, the court determined that RPAPL section 747-a
should be applied retroactively.3 0 5 Second, the court held that
the statute violated equal protection because it took away the
court's discretion to decide when a tenant should be required to
post money.30 6 The court reasoned that "the use of the word
'shall' in the language of RPAPL section 747-a... [did not] mean
'must' "because the word must "strip[s] the Court of discretion to
decide in what situations ... a tenant will be required to post
money ....- 3 07 Furthermore, the court found a violation of due
process, as "[tihe inability of the tenant to post the entire money
judgment would result in the tenant being evicted from the
apartment and deprived of that property right without a
hearing."30 8 Thus, "[plursuant to the inherent authority of the
Court," the court held that RPAPL section 747-a could not be
applied literally, at least in certain situations. 309
These decisions, though prior to Mennella, were decided
correctly and consistently with Mennella. In Mennella, although
300 677 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Civ. Ct. Richmond County 1997).
301 See id. at 207. The total judgment was for $3,825.00. See id.
302 See id. The first two payments totaled $2,660.00. See id.
303 See id.
304 See id.
305 See id. at 207-08. The statute was enacted on October 17, 1997, while the
action was commenced on August 6, 1997, prior to the effective date of the statute.
The default, however, occurred after the statute had gone into effect. See id. at 208.
306 See id. at 209 (referring to Article I, section 11 of the New York State
constitution).
307 Id. The court reasoned that to "mak[e] access to the Court available only to
those who can afford to make payments" was a violation of equal protection. IcL
308 Id. at 210.
309 Id. at 211.
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the Court of Appeals deferred to the legislature, the court
recognized that certain circumstances arise when a court has the
"inherent power, in the interests of justice" to massage the
statute. 310 The Yellen and Targee Management decisions are
consistent with this view. Fashioning the statute to the facts to
avoid violations of due process or equal protection is certainly in
the "interests of justice" and for "good cause."31 ' Indeed, the
Yellen court noted that on their face, the new amendments
"ha[ve] stripped the Court of any discretion in granting
adjournments" and that in certain circumstances, such as when
there is a need for an interpreter, this inherent discretion is
312
needed.
Most recently,
RPAPL
section
747-a was
held
unconstitutional in Jones v. Allen. 313 The court held that it was
proper to grant a stay without requiring a deposit. In Jones, the
tenant showed the court checks from the Department of Social
Services (DSS) in excess of the amount owed. 314 The checks,
however, were never deposited with the court because they were
not payable to the Finance Administrator. 315
The court,
nevertheless granted the stay, holding that the "[tienant's
showing that she had the full amount of the judgment (which
could not be deposited) and that the lateness in payment was
due to delay in receiving funds from DSS constituted a proper
basis to grant the temporary stays without requiring a
deposit." 316 The court held that a literal application of the
statute in such a situation would "substantially detract[] from
the ability of the court to achieve a just resolution of the
summary proceeding
[and thus] it cannot withstand
constitutional scrutiny."317

310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317

Mennela v. Lopez-Torres, 695 N.E.2d 703, 705 (N.Y. 1998).
Id.
See Yellen v. Baez, 676 N.Y.S.2d 724, 725 (Civ. Ct. Richmond County 1997).
712 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 2000).
See id. at 308.
See id.
Id. at 311.
Id.
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CONCLUSION

The enactment of the 1997 amendments to the RPAPL
seemed to provide a victory for landlords. They purported to
cure what were perceived to be abuses of the eviction process by
tenants. By limiting stays and adjournments and requiring
deposits of rent, RPAPL sections 745(2) and 747-a sought to
finally give landlords a speedy and effective remedy that they
had lacked in the past. The legislature's categorical, mandatory
language may have gone too far. Do the statutes infringe on the
court's inherent power and violate separation of powers? Do
they, when applied literally, violate due process and equal
protection?

Cases such as Yellen, Targee Management, and

Jones suggest that, at least under certain circumstances, the
answer is "yes." When necessary, deference to the legislature,
however, should yield to the court's discretion and power to
massage the statute in order to achieve a just result. The issue
is an important one that, in all likelihood, will not be decided
definitively until the New York State Court of Appeals rules on
it-something that is likely to happen within the next few years.
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